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Abstract 
This paper establishes that the banking sector in Russia is far less-developed than in the formerly 
socialist countries of Central Europe and that the underdevelopment of the financial sector is a drag 
on economic growth. It holds that the major cause of the financial crisis of 1998 was not losses on 
treasury-bill investments, as widely thought, but foreign exchange exposures, imprudent lending with 
limited risk diversification and bad management. The financial crisis, often regarded as not very 
damaging on account of the small size of the banking sector compared to GDP, caused substantial 
costs in terms of economic growth.  
An amazing feature of crisis resolution was that the authorities abstained from substantially 
restructuring the banking sector. With regard to much-needed reforms, alternatives are proposed to 
privatising Russia’s dominating state bank, Sberbank. The paper also recommends the introduction of 
two types of licenses for banks, rather than closing an excessively large number of inefficient banks 
that have an important role in serving distant areas. The paper concludes that although some steps to 
make the financial system more robust have been taken, swift and substantial action is still needed. 
 
 
 
 
 
Alfred Steinherr is the Chief Economist at the European Investment Bank. 
The author wishes to thank Irena Petrounova and Irina Ryzhova for their detailed comments without implicating 
their responsibility for remaining shortcomings and Roberta Benini for very useful editorial suggestions.  
Centre for
European 
Policy Studies  
CEPS Working Document
No. 209/October 2004Contents 
 
 
Introduction..............................................................................................................................................1 
1.  A bad start: 1988-98.........................................................................................................................1 
2.  The crisis of 1998.............................................................................................................................4 
3.  Does quick growth recovery justify the passive policy approach to restructuring?.........................7 
4.  The present state of the banking sector...........................................................................................10 
5. Unresolved  issues...........................................................................................................................11 
Problem 1: Lack of an enabling environment.................................................................................11 
Problem 2: Which banking model? ................................................................................................12 
Problem 3: Establishing a level playing field.................................................................................13 
Problem 4: How to increase trust in the banking system?..............................................................13 
Problem 5: Deepening financial intermediation.............................................................................15 
Problem 6: The regulatory framework ...........................................................................................16 
Problem 7: Corporate governance..................................................................................................17 
6. Conclusions ....................................................................................................................................18 
References..............................................................................................................................................19 
 
 
 | 1 
RUSSIAN BANKING SINCE THE CRISIS OF 1998 
CEPS WORKING DOCUMENT NO. 209/OCTOBER 2004 
ALFRED STEINHERR 
Introduction 
The evolution of the Russian banking sector since the crisis of 1998 is difficult to understand without 
first taking account of its origins after the demise of the socialist monobank system. Section 1 of this 
report reviews the period 1988-98 and sets out the salient features of the unfortunate naissance of a 
decentralised banking sector with private capital participation. 
Section 2 analyses the crisis of 1998 in which the entire banking system became illiquid and insolvent. 
As opposed to received opinion, this section argues that the default on government debt was not a 
major cause of the insolvency of banks. The major and unique cause was poor or absent regulation. 
That allowed banks to accumulate foreign currency borrowings without matching foreign currency 
assets. Banks were also totally free to enter into forward contracts in the foreign exchange market, 
which implied major risks. In addition to the unbalanced foreign-exchange assets and liabilities, with 
weak regulation and supervision banks were able to make imprudent and improper loans that became 
non-performing in the crisis. The Central Bank of Russia (CBR) was able to find solutions that 
minimised the losses for depositors, which minimised the impact on the structure of the industry. 
The crisis provided a historic opportunity to establish a framework closer to tested Western standards 
and to clean up the very peculiar Russian banking landscape. But not much happened. Section 3 
attempts an evaluation of the costs of the crisis and of not dealing with bank restructuring in terms of 
growth lost. Section 4 assesses the current state of the banking sector and identifies significant 
improvements since 1998. Section 5 discusses the unresolved issues and makes various policy 
proposals. Among others, it elaborates alternatives to the two big issues, in particular privatisation of 
Sberbank and closing hundreds of inefficient banks. Section 6 concludes. 
1.  A bad start: 1988-98 
As in all socialist economies, the Soviet Union operated with a monobank system consisting of a state 
bank (Gosbank) that operated as both a central bank and a commercial bank. In 1988 the government 
created a two-tier banking system, comprising the CBR and five ‘spetz’ banks (Agroprombank, 
Promstroibank, Sberbank, Vnesheconombank and Zhilsotsbank), which were designed to fund specific 
state programmes. Through the 1988 Law on Cooperatives, the government allowed the creation of so-
called ‘zero banks’, which were formed from private capital but often benefited from official financial 
sources. Additionally, many firms created ‘pocket banks’, which acted primarily as account agents for 
related companies. When Russia achieved statehood in 1992, the number of licensed banks exceeded 
1,300. 
Several factors caused this proliferation of banks. First, pro-sovereignty Russian politicians used lax 
entry conditions to break the financial power of the USSR state banking system. Second, high inflation 
made it easy to satisfy the minimum capital requirements for creating a bank. Third, former state bank 
officials used their connections in the CBR to speed up registrations. 
Responsibility for overseeing, regulating and licensing these banks fell to the CBR. From the 
beginning this task was exposed to conflicts of interest as the CBR was closely intertwined with 
commercial banks.
1 Many former branch banks of the Soviet-era Central Bank transformed themselves 
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into private commercial banks. The largest banks (Sberbank, Agroprombank, Promstroibank, VEB 
and VTB) remained in state hands, directly or through ownership by the CBR. Thus, the state/Central 
Bank of Russia owns a large part of the banking sector and the CBR is the regulator of all banks. 
The difficult and highly volatile macroeconomic environment of the 1990s would have made banking 
very difficult even for a mature banking sector. Further, property rights and legal procedures were in 
constant evolution, making lending to private companies difficult and risky. As a consequence, banks 
only marginally engaged in standard financial intermediation between savers and investors. Rather 
banks spotted the opportunity to extract resources from the state. The means by which banks extracted 
rents varied over time, but none generated incentives for banks to develop financial intermediation or 
to invest in better governance.  
Hyperinflation in 1992 and 1993 generated vast revenues for banks. Easterly and de Cunha (1993) 
estimate the transfer of wealth to banks through hyperinflation at 6 to 9% of GDP. For a sector with 
capital of less than 1% of GDP this is not bad. Banks paid negative real deposit rates and made loans 
at very large spreads. Some of the loans were disbursement of government credits granted to specific 
sectors or firms. On the external side, hyperinflation caused the dollar value of the rouble to fall 
sharply. Banks invested a large part of their rouble liabilities in dollar assets, making a pile of money. 
They also helped clients to transfer capital abroad against a sizeable cut. By the mid-1990s these 
fabulous gains cemented a powerful banking/industrial lobby (as most private banks are owned by 
industrial groups) that could start influencing policy to its advantage. 
Having prospered from hyperinflation during 1992 and 1993, banks found a new source of exceptional 
revenues in 1994. At that time the government began financing its deficit by issuing treasury bills 
(GKOs).
2 They were denominated in roubles and had maturities of up to 12 months. The banking 
industry lobbied successfully to exclude foreigners from the market. The CBR, acting as the issuing 
agency and the market-maker, sold GKOs only to a select group of banks. By the end of 1995 there 
were, however, over 130 primary dealers in the GKO market. Rates of return fluctuated between 20% 
and 250% in line with the market’s perception of inflation risk. Frye (2002) reported from Russian 
Economic Trends (5 March 1998) that during 1994-98 the Russian government obtained $15 billion 
from issuing GKOs, but the nominal value of GKOs held by lenders – mostly banks and the CBR 
through Sberbank (during 1997-98 they held an estimated two-thirds of outstanding GKOs) – was $70 
billion. 
Another source of rents extracted from the public sector was the management of local, regional and 
federal government funds. Johnson (2000) cites an estimate by the State Audit Chamber that banks 
earned more than $1.3 billion in 1995 and 1996 from these special relationships. In addition, the now 
infamous ‘loans-for-shares’ scheme, combined with the right to conduct the auctions in which they or 
related firms would participate, made some banks and their owners very rich.
3 
It is therefore not surprising that normal financial intermediation could not develop. Most firms 
outside the orbit of industrial groups owning the banks did not have access to credit. Those that 
obtained credit paid exorbitant mark-ups. In a situation of asymmetric information, the extremely high 
interest rates created a classic adverse-selection problem, as became clear during the crisis. 
Long-term finance has been unavailable as is generally the case in developing financial markets. Most 
credits had maturities of less than a year with uncertain rollover prospects and, in times of liquidity 
crisis, faced the prospect of the shortening of maturities or arbitrary recalls. Nor were there any 
incentives for bankers to lobby for clearer and more transparent regulation. On the contrary, banks 
lobbied against moving more quickly towards Western standards, promising ‘normal’ rates of return. 
                                                       
2 GKOs are zero-coupon instruments, so that the difference between the issuing price (what the government 
receives) and the maturity price (what the government pays back) reflects the interest payment. Since the CBR is 
entitled to keep half of its profits and turns over the other half to the federal government, the costs of GKOs held 
by the CBR were not offset for the Russian government. 
3 For details see Gros & Steinherr (2004). RUSSIAN BANKING SINCE THE CRISIS OF 1998 | 3 
 
When Central Bank Chairman Viktor Gerashchenko, whom Jeffrey Sachs once called the “worst 
central banker in the world”, stepped down after a botched currency reform in October 1994, Tatyana 
Paramonova took his place and seemed serious about banking regulation and governance. The 
Association for Russian Banks resisted her efforts to raise capital requirements for banks and in 
November 1995 Sergei Dubinin, who was strongly supported by the banking community, replaced her. 
The proliferation of private banks in a regulatory void and the peculiar relationship between banks and 
the government, and banks and industrial groups owned by oligarchs, which generated a bonanza of 
rents, are one side of the sad initial years. The other side is that the public sector did not disengage 
from banking. The CBR is a majority owner of the country’s largest bank, Sberbank, and until October 
2002 it also owned Vneshtorgbank (VTB), the country’s largest foreign trade bank. Sberbank is not 
only the largest bank but represents by itself a quarter or more of the banking sector (Table 1).  
Table 1 lists the largest 16 banks in 2002, four years after the crisis. The two largest banks by far are 
state banks. They also have the highest capital in relation to assets. To take two extremes, VTB has 
more than one-third of its assets covered by capital whereas Surgutneftegazbank has only 3% of assets 
covered by capital. Of these 16 banks only two are foreign-controlled. Most banks are part of an 
industrial holding. 
In terms of total assets, Sberbank has 25% of the banking sector and the second largest bank, VTB, 
has 5%. In terms of deposits, Sberbank has 75% of total deposits and 90% of deposits by households. 
There are three reasons for this domination. First, Sberbank is government-owned (more precisely 
CBR-owned) and enjoys the privilege of a state guarantee of its deposits. Second, it is the successor of 
the socialist monobank and has agencies throughout Russia. Third, being state-owned and present in 
all of Russia it is in charge of payment of government pensions. Pensioners hold 60% of Sberbank 
deposits. The State Pension Fund only deals with Sberbank (for a very good reason – Sberbank is the 
only bank with a presence throughout Russia) and transfers $1.5 billion monthly to Sberbank accounts. 
Table 1. Banks ranked according to total assets (in millions of roubles), 1 March 2002 
 Total  assets Capital 
1. Sberbank  859,390 103,158 
2. Vneshtorgbank  151,434 54,819 
3. Alfa-Bank  113,485 23,576 
4. GazPrombank  109,307 24,229 
5. International Business Bank  108,523 28,031 
6. International Moscow Bank  83,527 3,162 
7. Rosbank  70,114 8,840 
8. Bank Moscow  66,404 4,233 
9. MDM-Bank  47,189 5,222 
10. Surgutneftegazbank  45,329 1,284 
11. Doveritelnii lnvestitsionni Bank  44,339 4,255 
12. Citibank  43,769 5,415 
13. PromiyshlenniStroitelniiBank  37,008 3,019 
14. Menatep St. Petersburg  29,002 2,115 
15. UralSib  27,782 6,718 
16. Raiffeisenbank   25,069 2,127 
Source: Central Bank of Russia. 4 | ALFRED STEINHERR 
 
As a result there is not a level playing field. Sberbank can attract deposits at rates below those of its 
competitors, saving an estimated $100 million annually. But much more damaging is its dominance of 
the deposits market, depriving private banks of deposits as a source of funding. Banks can borrow 
from each other and the banking sector as a whole can borrow from the government, the central bank 
or the domestic or international capital markets. Borrowing from the government did occur but cannot 
be a regular source of funding. Even funding through the central bank, at times massive, cannot be a 
steady and growing source. What remains is the capital market. Yet the domestic capital market is not 
developed enough to provide substantial resources. Hence the need of Russian banks to borrow in 
foreign currency in external capital markets or from international banks. One could therefore argue 
that the crowding out of private banks from the deposit market through the privileges granted to 
Sberbank, combined with the lack of prudential rules for foreign currency exposures, created the 
vulnerability of the banking sector before 1998. 
In the early 1990s some politicians had already proposed government guarantees for all retail deposits. 
The CBR and the government saw the advantage of bringing ‘mattress money’ into banks, but were 
not ready to remove Sberbank’s advantage in the deposits market. The CBR also was able to block 
attempts at privatising some of its bank holdings. Spurred by the failure of pyramid schemes in 1994, 
the State Duma again proposed deposit insurance, but was blocked by the bankers’ lobby.
4 Following 
the crash of August 1998, both houses passed legislation backing deposit insurance, but President 
Boris Yeltsin vetoed it. Only 2004 saw the beginning of implementation of deposit insurance.  
These arrangements benefited the government and the CBR: in 1997 and 1998, the CBR and Sberbank 
held roughly two-thirds of GKOs, an arrangement that allowed the federal government to cover its 
deficit. The benefit for the CBR consisted in being able to retain half of its profits and to turn the other 
half over to government. This arrangement also provided incentives to underreport profits, for which 
the CBR uses a variety of schemes (such as relying on foreign banks owned by the CBR to buy and 
trade in GKOs and placing unreported funds abroad). According to the Audit Chamber of the Russian 
Federation, more than $50 billion passed through an account of the CBR in an obscure bank in Jersey, 
unreported to the government or the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
2.  The crisis of 1998 
Nevertheless, in early 1998 the CBR underlined the solidity of the Russian banking sector pointing to 
the high capital/assets ratios and valuing loan provisions as adequate. In the four years preceding the 
crisis, Russia had started to promote foreign capital inflows, which over the years could not 
compensate for the dramatic size of capital outflows. Remarkable is the fact that the government never 
seriously attempted to stop capital flight, which would have been easier than attracting foreigners to 
invest in Russia. 
Russia took advantage of the worldwide attraction of investors to emerging markets. Stabilisation 
succeeded in a rouble-dollar peg in July 1995 and Russia received financial support from the IMF and 
the World Bank. Mr. Yeltsin was re-elected in 1996, so the political uncertainty seemed to be over. In 
February 1996 foreign investors were allowed to buy GKOs in primary markets (against the 
opposition of the banking lobby) and to repatriate the related income. With foreign capital responding 
positively to these changes, the Russian stock market rose by 142% in 1996 and 184% during the first 
eight months of 1997. 
After the collapse of the stock market and the Asian crisis, concern surfaced over the possibility of 
Russia suffering the same fate as Thailand or Indonesia. Foreign institutional investors, attracted by 
the high GKO yields, purchased foreign-exchange coverage by entering into forward agreements with 
Russian bank counterparts. Investors worldwide reallocated their assets in favour of high quality. 
                                                       
4 The lobby feared that deposit insurance would be paid by banks and not the government, and that it would 
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Russia faced increasing difficulties in rolling over its debt and in supporting the exchange rate. In 
August 1998 it gave up on the exchange rate and froze GKO operations. 
The crisis revealed the underlying deep structural flaws of the banking sector. As Sberbank’s quasi-
monopoly in the retail sector had crowded out private banks they borrowed abroad. As of July 1998, 
75% of the foreign currency liabilities were concentrated in the 20 largest banks, where they 
represented 20% of total liabilities. Foreign currency assets were much less. In addition to a currency 
imbalance, there was a maturity imbalance as banks borrowed foreign currency short term to be rolled-
over (as long as that was possible) and lent longer term. 
Inadequate risk and liquidity management at commercial banks, inefficient nationwide settlement and 
clearing systems, poor monitoring by the CBR and exaggerated confidence in the CBR’s ability to 
keep the rouble fixed were factors that exacerbated these excessive risks. Management of banks that 
were part of an industrial holding pursued maximisation of the results for the holding and not for the 
bank. 
While all banks were affected by the crisis, the biggest impact was on the top 20 banks, excluding 
Sberbank and a few others. Large banks suffered losses from: 
•  positions on foreign-exchange forward contracts (only large banks could enter into such deals); 
•  the losses on the GKO portfolios; 
•  liquidity shortages owing to the outflow of client deposits (small banks had virtually no deposits); 
and 
•  defaults on margin calls. 
Large banks lost between 14% and 45% of their retail deposits. An exception was Sberbank, which 
kept the large majority of its rouble-denominated accounts, but lost over 30% of its US-dollar 
denominated accounts. To protect savers, the CBR offered to transfer savings from insolvent banks to 
Sberbank, since deposits at Sberbank were insured. Further, dollar accounts were transferred to 
Sberbank at a rate of 9 roubles per dollar (much below the market rate) whereby it is estimated that 
customers lost half of the value of their dollar deposits.  
Most analysts share the view that the effect of the banking crisis on the Russian economy was very 
limited. As bank lending to the private sector was underdeveloped and represented less than 10% of 
GDP, the temporary breakdown of financial intermediation could not be a big loss for corporations. In 
addition, large corporations were able to net deposits with loans granted to different parts of the 
industrial holding. They also were able to move their deposits before retail account holders as they had 
bargaining power over the banks. For example, Rossiisky Kredit, Inkombank and Menatep lost 
between 50% and 70% of their deposits between August and September. The major reasons for the 
financial crisis were the high concentration of assets among highly leveraged and badly managed 
banks, extraordinary exposure to foreign exchange risks and the loss of client confidence. 
The loss on GKO investments was not, contrary to a widely held view, a major cause of insolvability. 
Indeed, banks had significantly decreased their GKO investments before the default and converted the 
proceeds into dollar securities. By the time the GKO default occurred, banks had less than 10% of 
their assets invested in GKOs. What looks like smart or lucky management has a more earthy Russian 
explanation. Vladimir Potanin, head of Oneximbank, stated in an interview that bankers knew by 14 
August that the government would devalue on 17 August. Most large banks also took advantage of the 
debt-exchange programme of 15 July 1998, whereby the government offered to exchange short-term 
rouble treasury bills for 7-year or 20-year dollar Eurobonds to reduce the volume of short-term debt. 
This debt exchange was seen as a key part of a loan agreement with the IMF and the World Bank. 
Banks had accumulated very large forward contracts as counterparts of hedges against rouble 
devaluation, often taken by foreigners with GKO investments. These forward contracts represented an 
exposure to rouble devaluation, which since the end of 1997 was an increasingly likely event. Table 2 
presents an estimate of the exposure of some banks. This exposure, on a gross basis so that short and 6 | ALFRED STEINHERR 
 
long positions may provide some offset, is extraordinary. Most banks were short on rouble forward 
contracts so that the offsets were not very large. For some banks their forward exposure represented a 
large multiple of total assets. The most-exposed banks in relation to assets were MDM-Bank, Unibest 
and Metkombank.  
Table 2. Russian banks with largest forward contracts, 1 July 1998  
 Forward  contract
(billions of roubles) 
% of assets 
Inkombank 169.2  469.9 
National Reserve  99.4  944.4 
MDM-Bank 84.6  4,656.8 
Unibest 77.6  3,709.2 
Tokobank 66.9  871.7 
ONEKSIM-bank 47.3  197.9 
Sberbank 39.5  19.7 
SBS-Agro 31.2  115.8 
Avtobank 26.8  303.2 
GazPrombank 25.7  189.5 
Menatep 24.2  131.5 
Vneshtorgbank 24.1  132.9 
Mezhkombank 23.6  690.5 
Rossiski Kredit  22.0  113.8 
Metkombank 19.2  2,000.0 
Source: Gros & Steinherr (2004). 
In addition, larger Russian banks not only acted as counterparts to foreigners covering their rouble 
risks, they also bought dollars with smaller Russian banks as counterparts. Thus they had a large 
counterparty risk on their winning contracts and were on the losing side with strong foreign 
counterparties. In the end, a number of tricks allowed banks to reduce the impact of their foreign 
exchange risk. One trick was to invoke force majeure and another was to corner the spot market when 
the maturities of large contract amounts were bunched on specific dates. In the end, losses from non-
payment of government paper represented 18% of banks’ losses, whilst 82% were accounted for by 
foreign-exchange losses and losses from bad loans.  
One of the weaknesses of Russian banks has been the low diversification of loan portfolio risks. Even 
after the crisis, this is still the case. According to 2001 data, the ten most important borrowers 
accounted for half of the credit portfolio and almost 30% of all assets of the average Russian bank 
(Ippolito, 2002). It is often the case that a few key corporate clients dominate the credit institutions 
from which they borrow. In the smaller banks the ten largest credits amounted to 80% of their loan 
portfolio in 2001; in medium-sized banks their share reduced to 55-65%; and in large banks it 
averaged 45%. As asset amounts increase, credits are typically replaced by investments in securities.  
The view of a limited cost of the crisis, on account of the small size of the banking sector, is contrary 
to the experience in many countries with underdeveloped financial systems. Certainly the apparent 
cost was limited by luck: the increase in oil and other commodity prices started in 1999 and thereby 
helped the economy to resume growth again that year. Nevertheless, we show in section 4 that this 
view is unsustainable.  
Policy-makers (that is, the CBR and the government) treated the crisis as if it were only a liquidity 
crisis, although the IMF more realistically argued that the banking sector was largely insolvent. The 
following measures were taken. First, the government imposed a 90-day moratorium on all foreign 
debt. In principle, this had only a temporary effect and allowed banks with big foreign exposures to RUSSIAN BANKING SINCE THE CRISIS OF 1998 | 7 
 
buy time, as needed in a liquidity crisis. But in fact it reduced the real cost of banks. Suppose that in 
June 1998 a Russian bank bought dollars forward for September at 9 roubles. On the date in 
September the spot price is 15 roubles per dollar. It therefore owes the counterpart 6 roubles per 
dollar. But it does not have to pay immediately because of the moratorium. When the moratorium 
elapses the rouble is at 24 per dollar. If the bank has some dollars it can sell dollars against roubles and 
pay $0.25 for the 6 roubles it owes. In September the cost would have been $0.40 or 60% more. 
The second measure was to transfer deposits from banks with difficulties to Sberbank. This may have 
prevented a bank run but it seems that banks, although officially invited to transfer deposits, in fact 
had no choice. As the CBR is the owner of Sberbank, the policy appeared suspect. 
The third measure was to inject liquidity (46 billion roubles) into the banking system at rates 
significantly below market rates. Of that amount, 35 billion represented the cost of the government 
guarantee for the repayment of all deposits frozen at insolvent banks. Around 11 billion roubles were 
provided as short-term ‘stabilisation loans’ to the largest banks. The CBR made long-term loans to 17 
banks. The largest recipient (with 9 billion roubles) was Sberbank. Yet this strong support by the CBR 
was neither able to give clients confidence in their banks nor could it save all banks from insolvency.  
But surprisingly, few banks were actually closed. The total number of bank licenses revoked in 1998 
was 229 compared with 334 in 1997. Typically, when countries experience a banking crisis, a big 
restructuring follows to which a large number of banks – perhaps as much as 50% – fall prey. 
Acknowledging the experience of other countries that have suffered a banking crisis and have found it 
useful to create an independent agency in charge of the restructuring process, ARCO – the Agency for 
the Restructuring of Credit Organisations – was created in early 1999. But from the beginning ARCO 
suffered from fatal flaws: first, with capital of 10 billion roubles it was undercapitalised to effectively 
restructure the banking sector. Second, it lacked independence and fell under the control of the CBR. 
The chairman of the CBR was appointed chairman of ARCO’s board of directors and former Deputy 
Chairman of the CBR, Alexander Turbanov, was appointed its Director General. Third, ARCO lacked 
the right to close down insolvent banks or impose a restructuring plan. An additional law in July 1999 
gave ARCO the right to impose restructuring on insolvent banks. ARCO wasted most of its capital by 
buying up ‘off-market’ government bonds and by providing a loan of 1 billion roubles to the 
untroubled, but presumably well-connected Alfa Bank. This loan served to establish branches in 
regions facing problems with underdeveloped banking services. Alfa Bank opened 15 operational 
units in 14 regions. 
Altogether, by 2003 ARCO had participated in 21 projects in 12 regions of Russia. It had completed 
the restructuring of 14 banks and liquidated three banks. The total funding of restructuring measures 
amounted to 16 billion roubles, a very modest amount in comparison to the usual cost of cleaning up 
the banking landscape after a deep banking crisis. For comparison, the clean-up of the banking sector 
in Turkey after the crisis of 2001 is estimated to have cost $40 billion (Steinherr, Tukel & Ucer, 2004).  
In February 1999, the Law on the Bankruptcy of Credit Institutions was passed, providing a definition 
of a bankrupt bank and setting out bankruptcy procedures. Unfortunately, the Law protects incumbent 
shareholders and not creditors. It therefore did not stop asset-stripping and other manoeuvres. After the 
passage of the law, at least half of the top 10 banks moved their business to newly established bridge 
banks in violation of creditor rights.  
3.  Does quick growth recovery justify the passive policy approach to 
restructuring? 
Russia’s output recovered quickly following the outbreak of the crisis. Annual real GDP growth 
reached 5.4% in 1999, 9% in 2000 and has remained at an average of close to 6% since then. This is 8 | ALFRED STEINHERR 
 
exceptional and different from the experience of other countries. Empirical research on banking crises 
identifies several conditions for successfully overcoming a deep financial crisis, as follows:
5 
•  First, a comprehensive bank-restructuring programme is needed. This requires a solution for the 
stock of non-performing loans, initiatives to ensure that new loans are better performing and 
reforms of banks’ internal risk-management systems. 
•  Second, bank restructuring is best undertaken by the government and financed in a transparent 
way with tax revenues. This is preferable to central bank financing, which is less transparent, may 
lead to increased inflation and in the end to a higher fiscal cost. 
•  Third, these actions need to be carried out swiftly to minimise damage and fiscal cost.  
It is remarkable that Russia did not take any of these three steps. It was the CBR that acted as lender of 
last resort, as if the crisis had been a liquidity crisis. (Of course, at the beginning of a crisis it is 
difficult to distinguish between insolvent and temporarily illiquid banks.) As argued in section 3, these 
interventions by the CBR were neither transparent nor following a clearly defined strategy. 
The government neither implemented a bank restructuring programme nor a programme dealing with 
bank debtors, such as enforcement of overdue debt with pledged securities. The lenience of the CBR 
regarding the violation of prudential rules and its granting of uncollateralised stabilisation loans 
reinforced incentives for banks to ‘gamble for resurrection’. The consequence was taking high risks, 
distributing profits despite solvency problems and stripping assets.
6  
As a result, most of the bankrupt banks were not liquidated. It is true that bank licenses were revoked, 
but amazingly in fewer numbers than before the crisis as shown in Table 3. And banks with revoked 
licenses were not liquidated, but instead became ‘phantom banks’. 
Table 3. Number of credit institutions and revoked licenses in Russia, 1995-2002 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Number of credit institutions registered by CBR  n.a. 2589 2562 2481 2376  2124  2004 1826
Change  n.a. n.a. -27 -81 -105 -252 -120 -178
Revoked  licenses  216 275 329 227 127 33 12 10
Credit institutions liquidated   n.a. n.a. 52 73 100  258  144 216
Sources: IMF (2003); Central Bank of Russia, Bulletin of Banking Statistics, various issues. 
While there is a difficult trade-off between forbearance and action in dealing with a crisis, the 
literature on banking crises strongly suggests that delaying a comprehensive restructuring programme 
tends to raise the economic costs substantially. Given that after the crisis growth resumed very quickly 
in Russia, the question arises as to whether or not Russia did in fact (and contrary to the experience of 
other countries) adopt the right approach. 
A convincing answer to this question is given by Beck (2004) and the answer is no. He estimates a 
model for Russia based on the literature of ‘modern’ growth theory from 1995 to 2002 with quarterly 
data. This is a very short time-span with limited degrees of freedom. Nevertheless, he checks with 
estimation parameters from the literature and the results point in the same direction.  
Real growth is estimated with the following explanatory variables: a constant, the growth rates of the 
investment/GDP share, the dollar oil price, the real exchange rate, government expenditures/GDP, a 
dummy for the structural break in the third quarter of 1998 and indicators of financial development. 
The financial indicators used are those of the classic study by King & Levine (1993), namely financial 
                                                       
5 See among others, Gray & Holle (1996 and 1997), Dziobek & Pazarbasioglu (1997) and Tang et al. (2000). 
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depth as measured by broad money/GDP, the importance of banks measured with the ratio of banks’ 
domestic assets/banks’ plus central bank domestic assets, the share of credit to the non-financial 
private sector/GDP, the ratio of total bonds outstanding/GDP and other indicators. According to the 
results by King & Levine (1993), higher per capital growth is associated with higher levels of financial 
development. As they additionally find significant correlations between initial levels of financial 
development and subsequent economic growth, as well as capital accumulation and productivity 
growth, financial development can be an important cause of long-term growth.  
As shown in the last two columns of Table 4, between 1993 and 2002 there was significant 
development of the financial sector in Russia. The starting point, however, was extremely low, much 
lower than in two comparator countries, Hungary and Poland. Particularly the ratio of credit to the 
non-financial sector over GDP was and is very underdeveloped: one-third of the Hungarian-Polish 
average in 1993 and still only half of it in 2002.  
Table 4. Average levels of financial development of a large sample of developing and developed 
countries (excluding major oil exporters) during 1960-89, and for Poland, Hungary and 
Russia in 1993 and 2002 
 
Very slow 
growing 
countries 
Slow 
growing 
countries 
Fast 
growing 
countries
Very fast 
growing 
countries
Hungary 
1993 
2002
Poland 
1993 
2002
Average level 
of Hungary 
and Poland 
2002 
Russia 
1993 
Russia 
2002
Indicator 1  0.22  0.29  0.38 0.60 0.46 
0.47
031 
0.45 0.46 0.13 0.22
Indicator 2  0.60  0.71  0.73 0.81 0.55 
0.88
0.60 
0.96 0.92 0.59 0.79
Indicator 3  0.51  0.61  0.56 0.70 0.42 
0.68
0.30 
0.70 0.69 0.39 0.68
Indicator 4  0.13  0.20  0.27 0.35 0.28 
0.34
0.12 
0.25 0.30 0.07 0.15
Source: Beck (2004). 
Note: Indicator 1 is broad money/GDP; indicator 2 is banks’ domestic assets/total of banks’ and central bank domestic assets; 
indicator 3 is the share of credit to the non-financial private sector in total credit; indicator 4 is the ratio of credit to the 
non-financial private sector to GDP.  
In the growth regressions by Beck (2004) all the explanatory variables have the expected signs and are 
statistically significant. For example, the results suggest that a sustained increase in the price of oil by 
$10 would lead to an increase in real growth of 2.8%, while a sustained real depreciation by 10% 
would lead to an increase in growth of 2.5%. This confirms the notion that growth after 1998 was 
mainly because of the real devaluation and the increase in the world market price of oil. In fact, 
without the financial crisis growth would have been higher than the already healthy growth rate 
realised. The question then is what was the impact of the banking crisis on the growth rate? 
Beck simulates various scenarios of which two are of particular interest. In the first scenario it is 
assumed that Russia’s financial indicators would have continued their trend of improvement before the 
crisis, until 2002. The result would have been an increase in long-term growth by 1%. The second 
scenario is more ambitious. It asks what would have happened to Russian growth if Russia had been 
able to linearly increase its financial indicators to reach the average level that Poland and Hungary had 
in the year 2002. In that case, Russia’s long-term growth would have increased by 6.9%. This is most 
likely an overestimate, but even if the impact on growth was only half or a third of that amount, the 
result suggests the importance of financial reforms for the growth process. 
It should be recalled that the relation between growth and financial indicators is non-linear: a 10% 
improvement at a low level of financial development has a larger growth effect than the same 
improvement at a higher level of financial development. 10 | ALFRED STEINHERR 
 
These results suggest that the cost of the financial crisis in terms of real growth foregone is very high. 
It also provides support for the view that financial reforms pay off very richly and that Russia would 
benefit enormously from implementing financial reforms immediately. 
4.  The present state of the banking sector 
An assessment report of the IMF-World Bank (2003) concludes that in 2002-03, at least according to 
official data, banks were in general well-capitalised, although the quality of capital was questionable 
and loan loss provisioning may not have fully reflect risks. 
Stress tests imitating the events of the 1998 crisis indicated a continued vulnerability of the banking 
system. While overall liquidity is high, some banks have difficulty meeting temporary liquidity needs 
in a thin and fragmented interbank market.  
For example, in June 2004 a number of banks had to sell securities and loans to boost their cash 
position. These actions followed a sharp rise in the interbank rates and the beginning of a clamp down 
by the CBR on problem banks. In May 2004 the CBR closed Sodbusinessbank for alleged money 
laundering, followed by a run of depositors on some banks. In early July the liquidity crisis spread and 
brought Guta Bank into difficulties. Guta Bank was solvent and in assets ranked 20
th among Russian 
banks. In early July 2004, VTB, the state-owned bank, announced that it had refused a credit of $400 
million to Guta Bank. Guta Bank then turned to the CBR, which also denied it help. The CBR was, 
however, willing to provide a loan to VTB to finance VTB’s acquisition of Guta Bank. It therefore 
seems that ownership matters for CBR support and that nationalisation rather than privatisation is on 
the agenda.  
The way in which the CBR provided liquidity also demonstrates its unwillingness to modernise its 
regulatory approach and provide the framework for a market-based banking sector. For instance, it 
belatedly injected liquidity in a non-market conform way by halving the reserve requirements on the 
deposits of corporates from 7% to 3.5%. The liquidity crisis also induced depositors to transfer their 
money to Sberbank accounts for safety, reversing the recent trend of Sberbank’s declining market 
share.  
These recent events underline the precarious state of the banking sector with many dubious institutions 
still in existence (including institutions that continue without a license) and a regulator slow to clean 
up and unwilling to cease the business of owning banks.  
In line with the conclusions of section 4, the IMF-World Bank (2003) report stresses that banking-
sector reform is a matter of the highest priority if Russia is to achieve its growth potential. This will 
require strengthening the supervisory framework, enhancing the transparency of ownership, 
governance and financial reporting, and facilitating the consolidation of the fragmented private banks. 
The report also stresses the need to level the playing field between private and state banks, which is 
made uneven by the large size of Sberbank and by the 100% guarantee of household deposits for state 
banks. The CBR needs to close those banks that are non-viable, overburdened with connected lending 
or in transgression of supervisory norms. The IMF-World Bank report is, however, unable to give 
practical advice about how to convince a government and a central bank that have different views to 
act upon these recommendations. Clearly, as long as Russia does not need the IMF’s financial support, 
Washington institutions lack leverage to ensure that their policy recommendations are implemented.  
Russia enjoyed strong economic growth of about 6% on average during the last five years, with 
expected growth in 2004 of some 6% as well. During that time external debt as a percentage of GDP 
declined from 60% to 27%, while foreign currency reserves increased from $12.5 billion in 1999 to 
$77 billion at the end of 2003. Russia has also been upgraded to an investment grade by Moody’s in RUSSIAN BANKING SINCE THE CRISIS OF 1998 | 11 
 
2004, which has contributed to a gain in trust and international acceptance and helped to reduce the 
risk premium in interest rates paid by Russian borrowers on international markets.
7 
In this environment, the assets of the banking sector increased from $50 billion in 1998 to $190 billion 
in 2003 and retail deposits grew from $10 billion to $47 billion. Overall deposits reached $90 billion at 
the end of 2003, of which $25 billion were in foreign currency. Expansion of money markets eased the 
liquidity management of banks and money market instruments held by banks at the end of 2003 
amounted to close to $30 billion.
8 On the lending side, the relative importance of lending to the public 
sector significantly declined in favour of private borrowers.  
Profitability of the sector has strongly improved, also helped by the cut in corporate income tax from 
43 to 24% in 2002. As a result, bank equity strongly increased to about $30 billion at the end of 2003. 
The banking sector has expanded its networks and moved more decisively into mid-market corporate 
and retail segments. Banks have gradually adopted international accounting standards (IAS), a process 
to be completed by 1 October 2004. Some banks have improved corporate governance standards and 
have adopted asset liability management (ALM) standards and procedures.  
Nevertheless, despite recent advances, the bank asset/GDP ratio of 42.1% at the end of 2003 and the 
loans/GDP ratio of 19.3% are much lower than in the Western transition countries. High operating 
costs suggest unresolved shortcomings in efficiency. Many banks rely heavily on business with related 
parties, such as shareholders, and avoid market forces. Connected lending and group internal-asset 
transfers remain unresolved issues. Poor governance, opaque legal structures and inappropriate or non-
existent risk-management systems continue to be major problems in the sector. 
In 2003 the risk-weighted capital adequacy ratio (CAR) stood at 18.6%. This looks encouraging 
although the Russian definitions of risks and of capital are not identical to Basle standards. In the same 
year the CBR tightened the definition of capital, eliminating ‘improper assets’ (a concept beyond 
comprehension for Westerners!) with the result that CARs declined modestly. With the generalised 
introduction of the IAS in 2004, these problems should to some extent disappear. Effective 2005, 
banks with capital of less than €5 million will be subject to a minimum CAR of 10%. In 2007 all 
banks will be required to have a minimum capital of €5 million and a CAR of 10%.  
The share of foreign assets and liabilities in Russian banks and their net balance has declined since 
1998. In 2003 foreign assets stood at 32% of total assets and liabilities at 29% of total liabilities.
9 
Therefore decline in the rouble exchange rate would not noticeably hurt the aggregate Russian 
banking sector.  
The highly fragmented structure of the banking sector relies heavily on state banks, with a modest 
contribution of 8% by foreign banks and a core private sector that accounts for only 22% of the total 
amount of banking assets. The fragmentation of the sector is further illustrated by the fact that in 2004 
only 36% of credit institutions have capital of more than €5 million, about 38% have capital of €1-5 
million and over 26% have capital of less than €1 million (CBR, 2004). 
5.  Unresolved issues 
Problem 1: Lack of an enabling environment  
The development of the banking sector is a function of what could be called an ‘enabling 
environment’: the role of the state, the legal framework and the efficiency of the judiciary system, 
                                                       
7 In 2004 this gain in trust has been squandered again through the handling of the Yukos affair. Standard & 
Poor’s has delayed its upgrading and Russian international bonds have trailed other emerging-market debt 
instruments. Capital flight out of Russia has accelerated again. 
8 The source of the data used in this section is CBR (2004). 
9 As assets exceed liabilities, these percentages do not imply a net long position. In fact, the banking sector has a 
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socially-accepted ethical standards, generally applied rules of transparency and the quality of company 
reporting, the solidity of ownership rights, the independence and professionalism of the central bank, 
development of the non-bank financial sector, corporate governance of firms in general, access of 
firms and households to banking services, and, perhaps surprisingly, geography. On all these 
parameters, Russia has shortcomings or difficulties and therefore lacks an enabling environment.  
As the Yukos affair has demonstrated, the Russian state’s vision of a market economy is different 
from Western concepts. This seriously weakens ownership rights and induces Russians to keep a 
substantial part of their savings abroad or under the mattress. Withdrawals of deposits can be 
arbitrarily taxed, which is a further deterrent. 
The Russian state continues to hold participations in many banks. It owns the largest banks directly or 
indirectly through Sberbank. In addition, it holds participations of less than 25% of capital in some 
400 banks (the government has stated its readiness to privatise these participations) and participations 
of more than 25% in more than 40 banks (considered as ‘strategic’ and therefore not for sale). The 
government’s seriousness in not privatising these participations was confirmed in 2003 when it took 
over VTB from the CBR instead of privatising it. It has the very valid fear of handing over even more 
control to oligarchs and has remained concerned about the role of foreign banks. In fact, the Putin 
administration mistrusts market forces and they cannot be blamed. The Russian economy has little in 
common with a ‘competitive equilibrium’ delivering socially optimal outcomes. Being unable to 
create the necessary institutions and controls, some of their ad hoc attempts include using the banks 
under government control for directing resources into allocations of political interest. 
The Yukos affair has also demonstrated that the judiciary is a servant of the state and not of the law.
10 
While a variety of new laws concerning banking can be considered as very positive developments, 
applicability in the ‘spirit of the law’ remains doubtful. The rights of lenders (depositors) have been 
strengthened but in judiciary proceedings these continue to lack clear and full protection against 
owners. The seniority ranking of claims is in practice subject to power plays among stakeholders. 
Geography is a major constraint for the development of an efficient banking sector. To most 
Westerners the number of banks in Russia seems excessive. Most banks, however, are very small and 
serve distant locations across the vast expanse of Russia. The operations of large private banks are 
concentrated in Moscow, St. Petersburg and other large industrial cities. There is no incentive to cover 
larger parts of Russia. Sberbank fills the gaps but only partially. As in the US, where more than 10,000 
banks (most of which are very small) cover rural towns across the country, small banks in Russia also 
serve distant areas. Further, where the productivity and efficiency differences between money-centre 
banks and rural savings & loans (S&Ls) associations are huge in the US, the same is true for Russia.  
Problem 2: Which banking model? 
At the beginning of the transition process in the early 1990s there was a debate among European and 
American academics and bankers as to the appropriate approach to the creation of a market-based 
financial system (Gros & Steinherr, 1995). Americans favoured rapid development of capital markets 
and Europeans put the emphasis on quickly setting up an efficient banking system. As the institutional 
requirements for a deep and efficient capital market are much more demanding than for banking 
(Steinherr & Huveneers, 1994) the debate was a purely theoretical one. In practice efforts were made 
to create both but it was soon realised that the establishment of a well-functioning capital market takes 
considerable time, particularly in countries where institutions have remained weak. The banking sector 
therefore took the lead.  
                                                       
10 Perhaps the only practical way of reducing the power of oligarchs and to limit the sale of assets to foreign 
companies (Yukos was in negotiation with Exxon) was to strike an example. For a Western economist it would 
have been preferable to introduce a stiff wealth tax, to be paid annually in cash or equity, for, say, a period of 10 
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In the 1990s, the segmentation of banking – a hallmark of the US system since the Glass-Steagall Act 
– was already on the way out and in any case Europeans have always believed in the tradition of 
universal banking. Russia today has an underdeveloped capital market and universal banking. 
Ownership of most private banks is dominated by industrial groups, so that the Russian system most 
closely resembles the Japanese keiretsu system. Arguably, there was no alternative. But this does not 
mean that all banks have to be universal. A small bank serving the people in a distant provincial town 
should be limited to deposit collection, liquidity management and lending. It does not need to be 
universal. In the US, for example, S&Ls are severely restricted in their scope of banking activities. 
As demonstrated in Steinherr & Huveneers (1991), problems of conflict of interest and insider 
information are particularly pronounced in universal banking. A strong regulatory environment is 
therefore needed to limit the possible pitfalls. 
Transition countries in Central Europe have relied on foreign banks to modernise their banking sector. 
This model has no chance in Russia. A country as large as Russia cannot be expected to give foreign 
banks a large stake and the state is not ready to withdraw from banking given its central role in 
resource allocation. Foreign banks are allowed to establish subsidiaries upon approval by the CBR. A 
foreign subsidiary is required to have capital in excess of €10 million; also, 75% of employees and 
50% of board members must be Russian. Foreign institutions are allowed to take minority 
participations in Russian banks but cannot acquire a majority holding. 
Recently, BNP (France) was the first foreign bank to invest up to the allowed limits in a Russian retail 
bank, the Russian Standard Bank (RSB), a major player in consumer credits. BNP acquired 50% of a 
holding company that owns 90% of RSB.  
Problem 3: Establishing a level playing field  
With regard to state banks, some should be privatised. A good example is VTB. Sberbank is a more 
difficult case. At the least Sberbank should be held to the same standards of prudential rules as other 
banks and put under a hard budget constraint. The anomaly of CBR ownership should also be 
resolved. This could entail privatisation or transformation into a ‘narrow bank’.
11 As privatisation may 
be difficult for the Russian authorities to accept, and the bad privatisations of the jewels of Russian 
industry in the 1990s are still a scar on Russian collective memory, the narrow-bank solution would be 
an attractive alternative. 
It would maintain Sberbank’s role as a deposit-taker across Russia but limit its role as a lender. By 
restricting its assets, for example, to liquid, high-quality securities and loans to SMEs, it would play a 
central role in the development of the money market in Russia and of a loan market for SMEs. If 
Sberbank had to invest a large part of its assets in money markets this would give a boost to the 
development of commercial paper and certificate-of-deposit markets and provide support for short-
term government borrowing. Those banks with an insufficient deposit base could then more easily 
borrow in the money market. Unfair competition with private banks would be stopped. The safety and 
resilience of the financial system would gain and the risk for taxpayers would be reduced. According 
to Bisignano (1997), the narrow depository bank is in a sense a very modern concept and a natural 
evolutionary outcome of the ‘unbundling’ of financial services. 
Problem 4: How to increase trust in the banking system? 
This is not an easy task, as Russians in general fail to have confidence, for very good reasons, in state 
institutions, including courts and the police, as well as the market institutions they are experiencing. 
As long as the enabling environment is not fundamentally changed there is little hope. Individual 
measures may succeed in ameliorating lack of trust without changing the present ‘bad equilibrium’ 
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into a ‘good equilibrium’. An important if insufficient step was taken with the Federal Law on 
Insurance of the Deposits of Natural Persons of 23 December 2003, which created the basis for the 
introduction of a deposit insurance scheme. The aims are to increase trust in the banking system and 
thereby attract part of the large volume of household savings still held in foreign cash (this ‘mattress 
money’ has been estimated at $40-80 billion as compared to total household bank deposits of some 
$50 billion), to level the playing field between state banks and private banks, and to serve as a 
mechanism to withdraw licenses from unsound banks. Ideally, a deposit insurance scheme should be 
introduced after the banking system’s restructuring and once a strong supervisory system is in place, 
and not before. Given multiple constraints and the contents of the Law, however, deposit insurance at 
this stage is a good compromise.  
Western experience with deposit insurance suggests that in order to minimise moral hazard (i.e. that 
depositors do not care about the quality of their bank as they are insured), the amount of deposit 
insurance should be limited. In the European Union, insurance is limited to amounts ranging from 
€20,000 in Austria, Belgium, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Spain to 
€103,291 in Italy. This represents a range of one-half to four times the average annual income. The 
Law limits coverage to 100,000 roubles (about €3,000) or close to the Russian average annual income 
93,000 roubles in 2003). Institutional deposits are not insured as institutions should be expected to be 
better able to evaluate the solvability of their banking relationships. Nevertheless, since the law does 
not provide for any indexation of this upper limit, two-digit inflation and high real growth will ensure 
that in a few years the insurance limit will rapidly decline with respect to annual average income. At 
present it is estimated that the scheme covers about 85% of all retail deposits. In the case of a bank’s 
liquidation, the claims of all other creditors are de facto subordinated to those of retail savers. Moral 
hazard is therefore minimised. The price to pay is that the amount of savings attracted from mattresses 
into the banking system will be limited. 
Deposits at foreign banks are exempted from the insurance scheme, another indication that foreign 
banks are not courted by Russian authorities. The effect is surely not substantial as foreign banks 
enjoy much greater trust with Russian depositors than Russian banks. Some Russian commentators 
even fear that deposit insurance favours foreign banks as the amount insured is too low to offset higher 
trust in foreign banks. 
The Law provides for ex ante financing of the scheme. ARCO will endow the new Deposit Insurance 
Agency with 3 billion roubles. Participating banks will pay a premium each quarter of no more than 
0.15% of the average value of their insured deposits in the preceding quarter. This maximum rate will 
fall to 0.05% once the fund has accumulated the equivalent of 5% of the insured deposit base. In 
specific circumstances, the premium could be raised to 0.3% for up to 18 months. These premia are far 
higher than those levied in the US or Western Europe. It is known, however, that some Western 
systems significantly under-price risk, as the FDIC in the US has recently acknowledged (FDIC, 
2001). In addition, Russian banks are indeed riskier than their Western counterparts. There is no cap 
on the fund as in some deposit insurance schemes. If the fund is unable to meet its obligations, the 
Agency may apply to the government for budgetary support.  
Ex ante financing runs the risk of time-inconsistency and may induce more risk-taking after premia 
have been paid. Once paid, premia are sunk costs and provide banks with no incentive to monitor 
peers, an important advantage of ex post systems. Yet in the Russian case ex ante financing seems 
preferable for gaining trust as commitments to ex post payment lack credibility in the Russian context. 
The Deposit Insurance Agency is to be a state corporation. Its board of directors will consist entirely 
of representatives of the government and the CBR. The CBR will play a key role, as banks will be 
allowed to join only with CBR approval. Those not admitted to this compulsory scheme will lose the 
right to work with retail clients. De facto, a two-tier banking system will be created.  
Compulsory membership will be combined with detailed bank screening by the CBR. The CBR sees 
the Law as an opportunity to tighten up its prudential supervision of banks. In effect the screening 
process is a general re-licensing of the banking sector to a higher standard.  RUSSIAN BANKING SINCE THE CRISIS OF 1998 | 15 
 
The deadline for banks to apply for admission to the Deposit Insurance Agency was on 27 June 2004. 
The CBR must complete its examination of each applicant within nine months of its application. 
One of the explicit aims of the deposit insurance legislation is to level the playing field between 
Sberbank and private banks. The Law stipulates that state guarantees extended to all Sberbank 
deposits will remain in force until 1 January 2007. Sberbank will pay into the deposit insurance 
scheme from its foundation, but its premia will be kept in a separate account (and may only be used 
for payouts on Sberbank deposits until its share of household deposits falls below 50% or until 1 
January 2007, whichever comes first).  
An amendment of the Law approved by Gosduma at the end of July 2004 restricts the unlimited state 
guarantee on Sberbank deposits to those opened before 1 November 2004. This contributes to 
levelling the playing field. 
Another implication of the deposit insurance scheme is to stop an anomaly of the Russian Civil Code 
that requires retail deposits to be available on demand, even if contracted for a specified term. Hence, 
all retail deposits are effectively demand deposits. The authorities explicitly linked the adoption of the 
deposit insurance law to the amendment of this Civil Code provision. 
Problem 5: Deepening financial intermediation 
Both the banking sector and financial markets are less developed in Russia than in Western transition 
countries. In 2003 the monetisation of the economy as measured by M2/GDP reached 30% and 
outstanding bonds represented 5% of GDP. The market value of equities outstanding represented 27% 
of GDP, much higher than in other transition countries.  
Nevertheless, shares of 8 companies out of more than 200 quoted on MICEX accounted in 2003 for 
98% of market turnover. Unified Energy Systems (UES) alone accounted for 64%. On the Russian 
Trading System (RTS) exchange 10 out of 300 stocks accounted for 93% of turnover. The aggregate 
share of power and oil companies represented 99% of turnover on MICEX and 95% on the RTS. The 
stock exchanges thus depend on just a few corporations and badly need to diversify. 
In 2003 the CBR made efforts to develop money and capital markets by offering a wider spectrum of 
maturities in regular auctions. In the deposit market it has extended the range from two-week deposits 
to three months. Repos with government bonds were extended to 804 days (CBR, 2004).  
The payments system has improved substantially, although a single unified system is still wanting and 
efficiency can be improved. Around 80% of payments in 2003 were conducted electronically. About 
60% of transactions transit through the CBR, which sets the rules for its own and the private payment 
systems. 
A weak point remains the clearing and securities settlement infrastructure. Payments systems still do 
not comply with international standards regarding payments in real time and payments against 
delivery. 
Another major problem to be tackled is the very limited access of SMEs to external finance. Important 
steps to improve present conditions would comprise measures such as establishment of a credit 
information service and a movable property registry – a so-called ‘pledge registry’.  
To facilitate lending it will be necessary to strengthen creditor rights (those of depositors with respect 
to banks, and banks with respect to borrowers). Creditor rights are still patchy in terms of the taking of 
security over movable property and enforcement procedures. The Russian legal approach relies more 
heavily on liquidation than on rehabilitation. The goal must be the predictable, swift and inexpensive 
enforcement of secured creditor claims. 16 | ALFRED STEINHERR 
 
This will also require improvements to insolvency procedures and a collective resolution of claims. An 
effective insolvency procedure supports the financial restructuring of viable firms, the orderly exit of 
failed firms and the improvement of debt-collection mechanisms for creditors.
12  
In Western markets mortgage-backed loans represent the major instrument for lending to SMEs and 
for long-term household borrowing. The availability of mortgage loans is a major requirement for 
private real estate construction and renovation. In Russia this market is still in its infancy and the state 
of dilapidation of the housing stock is a reflection of the difficulties of securing appropriate financing. 
Improvement of the public real estate registry and mortgage registration is important and does not 
pose insurmountable political opposition. 
Problem 6: The regulatory framework 
Since 1998 the regulatory framework has improved and financial legislation has created the means for 
implementation. This would allow the CBR (and the recommendation is to proceed swiftly) to tighten 
the definition of capital and to enforce this new definition and capital adequacy norms. The CBR 
should redesign the loan-loss provisioning rules to rely more on a qualitative assessment of risks and 
vigorously enforce the higher loan-loss provisioning requirements. The general adoption of 
international accounting standards in 2004 provides an excellent starting point. According to the IMF-
World Bank (2003) assessment report, banks not meeting capital adequacy standards should be 
liquidated.  
A more innovatory approach to restructuring the banking sector would involve the creation of a two-
tier or three-tier banking license, as proposed and elaborated in Gros & Steinherr (1995). A first-tier 
bank would have to satisfy the capital adequacy and the loan-loss provision rules, participate in the 
payments system and be a member of the deposit insurance scheme. Deposits would then be 
considered relatively safe, even in a banking environment with modest deposit insurance coverage. 
First-tier banks would have access to central bank refinancing but would also have to hold required 
reserves with the central bank. For them the central bank would act as lender of last resort. 
Needless to say, these conditions cannot be met by most of the some 1,300 banks in existence. Many 
of them, even if they met the basic requirements with difficulty, would pose a risk to the system. 
Therefore it might be preferable to give them a second-tier license. The type of license would have to 
be indicated at the entry of each bank building and on its stationary, to clearly and unambiguously 
inform potential customers. Or alternatively, the name ‘bank’ could be reserved for tier-one 
institutions and tier-two institutions could be called ‘finance corporations’. They would be subjected to 
a lighter regulatory framework and supervision. They would not enjoy the privileges of tier-one banks, 
such as participation in the payments and the deposit insurance systems but would not be subjected to 
the same demanding capital adequacy and loan provisioning standards either. 
Tier-two banks would need to offer higher interest rates on deposits to compensate depositors for 
higher risk. They would need to make loans to riskier projects such as SMEs to generate returns. They 
could continue with connected lending and could speculate in capital and foreign exchange markets 
without regulatory hindrances. In the context of Russia, this approach might be preferable to closing 
down hundreds, if not up to a thousand banks. It would give depositors a choice; it would maintain 
banks in distant areas that have limited diversification scope. As the capital market is still 
underdeveloped, savers could more easily diversify their savings and their returns. 
This segmentation of banks is not entirely novel. In the US, the Glass-Steagall Act separated 
commercial from investment banking with similar effects. In particular, investment banks had neither 
the obligations nor the privileges of a bank license, such as, for example, access to central bank 
support.  
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At any rate, as discussed above, Russia will de facto have a two-tier banking system: the first-tier 
comprising banks with deposit insurance and the second-tier consisting of banks that do not enjoy 
deposit insurance and hence are barred from retail banking. In light of the above proposal a review of 
the implications of the de facto two-tier system may by beneficial. 
Problem 7: Corporate governance 
Corporate governance defines the privileges and duties of companies and their management. It defines 
the rights (to be informed) and obligations (to exercise control and contribute to maximising 
shareholder value subject to the constraints of the law) of all stake-holders (governments, workers, 
shareholders and consumers). The economic situation in Russia worsens the position of workers and 
consumers. The state arguably exercises too much of an excessively diffuse influence that lacks 
transparency. Minority shareholders enjoy limited rights. In developed Western markets, particularly 
in the US, the capital market exercises strong control by selling under-performing firms or by 
launching a leveraged buyout to replace management. With less-developed capital markets and an 
aversion to takeovers by foreigners, such control is ineffective in Russia. Further, a very bad start with 
market institutions makes it difficult to redress the situation.  
The recent revision of the Law on Joint Stock Companies amended more than half the articles of the 
old law of December 1995. This is a very positive step forward. Similarly, the Corporate Governance 
Code formulated by the Federal Commission on Securities Market (FCSM) is close to international 
standards and in some respects even more demanding (IIF, 2002). Nevertheless, the primary 
weaknesses of corporate governance in Russia are in implementation, so that the major problems of 
lack of transparency of ownership and of control structures persist. Legislation needs to be 
implemented and in some aspects further clarified to establish ultimate ownership, to require 
disclosure of related party transactions and to limit insider dealings. All these problems are difficult to 
correct in Russia where powerful interest groups are able to defend their interests. Russia is extreme, 
but not unique in this regard. Similar problems have barred the development of many emerging 
economies. Even in the US, it required nearly a century and the crash of 1929 to curb the power and 
wealth of the ‘robber barons’.  
The Glass-Steagall Act put an end to universal banks in the US and their ownership by powerful 
families, and limited the geographic expansion of banks. In Russia, it would seem particularly 
important to limit the control of banks by industrial groups. One solution would be to limit the share of 
banks held by an industrial group to, say, 25%. The limitations of the capital market, the reluctance of 
the government to invite participations from foreign banks and the power of the industrial groups are 
major obstacles for such a reform.  
For the development of capital markets, Russia needs to shed the casino character of its stock market. 
Stock markets themselves lack the independence to elaborate rules of transparency for quoted 
corporations. Therefore the state must take the lead to narrow the gap with respect to market-based 
institutions. It needs to elaborate legal definitions of the rights and obligations of management and 
boards of directors, with vigorous judicial enforcement, and rules to improve the principal-agent 
problem between shareholders and management. The most urgent action needed is that of 
strengthening the rights of small shareholders (such as rules on proxy voting, qualified-majority 
decisions on strategic issues and small shareholder representation on supervisory boards). In addition, 
Russian authorities could take inspiration from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to increase the professional 
competency of boards of directors and to make top management personally responsible for 
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Fiduciary duties of supervisory boards are poorly defined, relying on spongy concepts such as ‘good 
faith’ or ‘reasonableness’. The Code of Corporate Conduct of April 2002 could be amended to provide 
a general set of principles for the conduct of boards and other committees for legal clarity. 
13  
6.  Conclusions 
This paper established that the banking sector in Russia is far less developed than in the formerly 
socialist countries of Central Europe and that the underdevelopment of the financial sector is a drag on 
economic growth. 
We discussed the contributing factors to the financial crisis of 1998 and came to the conclusion that 
losses on GKO investments, often considered as a major source of loss and a cause of the banking 
debacle, were, in fact, marginal. The major causes of the crisis were foreign exchange exposures, 
imprudent lending with limited risk diversification and bad management. 
We showed that the financial crisis, often regarded as not very damaging on account of the small size 
of the banking sector compared to GDP, caused substantial costs in terms of economic growth. 
An amazing feature of crisis resolution was that the authorities abstained from substantially 
restructuring the banking sector. Instead they provided liquidity in an opaque fashion and invited 
gambling for resurrection. Russia overcame the crisis swiftly thanks to good luck (the increase in the 
oil price) and to the real devaluation of the rouble. Therefore the errors it made became less visible. 
But the cost in terms of missed growth has been substantial.  
Nevertheless, in the meantime the legal basis was created for more decisive actions and this report 
urges their implementation. A particular problem is that Sberbank is owned by the Central Bank of 
Russia and treated with many discriminatory favours. An alternative to privatisation, we propose the 
transformation of Sberbank into a ‘narrow bank’. Other state banks should be privatised, however, 
preferably by inviting foreign banks as bidders. Indeed, the share of foreign banks in the Russian 
banking sector is much smaller than in other former socialist economies. In those countries the 
experience of selling banks to foreign institutions is a very positive one.
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For the restructuring of the banking sector we recommend an alternative to closing down many 
hundreds of inefficient banks. The alternative consists of creating two-tier banking licenses. Most of 
the new measures regarding capital adequacy and loan loss provisions would only apply to tier-one 
banks. Only they would enjoy the privileges of participating in the payments system and the deposit 
insurance scheme and only they would have access to central bank refinancing. We see benefits in 
dealing with the excessively large number of banks in this way rather than closing down most of them. 
How likely is swift and substantial action? Past reluctance to reform the financial sector gives limited 
support for optimism. Although the Putin administration has displayed greater interest in improving 
governance in general, bank reform does not seem to be at the top of the agenda. The key players – the 
government, the CBR and the large industrial holdings that control the largest private banks – have 
their own agendas, which may not be aligned with maximising social welfare. But pessimism should 
not be exaggerated either. Some steps to make the financial system more robust have been taken, such 
as the introduction of a very sensible deposit insurance system, and more will come. It seems that 
Russia needs more time than other countries and is more easily strays off the optimal path. The risk is 
that it will remain a prisoner of a ‘bad’ equilibrium. 
                                                       
13 Such actions will take many years to bring about fundamental changes. The present difficulty is the result of 
the excessive influence of oligarchs and the power struggle between the state and the tycoons. 
14 See for example Gros & Steinherr (2004) and Steinherr (1997). | 19 
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